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Legal Education in Pakistan: The 
Domination of Practitioners and the 
“Critically Endangered” Academic
Osama Siddique
In any discussion of the general state of legal education in Pakistan, the 
role of lawyers merits special attention. According to one estimate, Pakistan 
has 74 law colleges affiliated with 16 universities.1 Historically underfunded 
and ignored, state law schools in Pakistan never have developed a favorable 
environment for a quality local research to flourish. At the same time, private 
law schools that emerged a few decades ago have largely pursued profit and 
done little to raise the quality of legal education. Finally, the general society 
never really has experienced and as a result has not learned to value what 
legal academics and scholars do. “Law teacher” is the closest attempt by most 
judges, lawyers and the public at large to describe the phenomenon. While the 
absence of a legal academy has resulted in negligible improvement of teaching 
and research standards, it also has impoverished the larger national discourse 
on law, rights and justice. Few and far between to start with, legal academics 
in Pakistan—employing the parlance of life sciences—are now a “critically 
endangered” species that may soon even be “extinct in the wild.” Therefore, 
chance and increasingly rare sightings in the rarefied atmosphere of a sundry 
conference may be the only way to observe one—if a complete “extinction” 
does not occur. This is a brief discussion of how this state of affairs came about. 
Conflicting Regulatory Jurisdictions and the Domination of Lawyers
Teaching at Pakistani law schools primarily is undertaken by practicing 
lawyers, as well as retired lawyers and judges. Lawyers also have assumed 
prominence in the regulatory oversight of legal education, the accreditation 
and evaluation of law schools, curricular design, and standard setting. 
1. See Faqir Hussain, The Judicial System of Pakistan (2011), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/thejudicialsystemofPakistan.pdf [hereinafter 
Judicial System of Pakistan]. Dr. Hussian is the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan 
and this report was presented at the Annual Judicial Conference in Islamabad in 2011.
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The Pakistan Bar Council—the national elected organization of Pakistani 
lawyers—thus occupies a role usually entrusted to autonomous law schools, 
state regulators and career academics. The Higher Education Commission of 
Pakistan, the apex regulatory body for university education in the country, 
also claims this role. This conflict arises because two statutes were introduced 
at different points in time, empowering both for this function without any 
serious thought to the suitability and capacity of either for the role nor any 
attempt to rationalize overlapping jurisdictions. The bar council, while largely 
neglecting its primary function of regulating the legal profession, always had 
the ascendant role in this confused milieu. However, jurisdictional uncertainty 
largely causes neither to play any meaningful role. Even otherwise, neither the 
bar council nor the education commission has developed and demonstrated 
much capacity or will to address the continuing decline in legal education as 
genuine stakeholders.2 
Weber and the Pakistani Legal Education System
Many issues are posed by the domination of lawyers in legal education 
in Pakistan. This has meant, for example, that the bent and emphasis of the 
nation’s legal education primarily has been to impart a craft-like specialization. 
It may be useful here briefly to examine Max Weber’s typology of professional 
legal training and the various legal modes of thinking. In my view, the prevalent 
manner of legal training in Pakistan can be seen as similar to, in Weber’s terms, 
an “empirical training in the law as a craft; the apprentices learn from the 
practitioners more or less in the course of actual legal practice.” His alternative 
type of legal training occurs in “special schools, where the emphasis is placed 
on legal theory and ‘science,’ that is, where legal phenomena are given rational 
and systemic treatment.”3 In the Pakistani legal academy—more or less devoid 
of engaged, full-time research-driven academics—lawyers largely determine 
academic curricula, set standards and teach. This scenario differs little in 
effect from Weber’s first type, where law is taught by the lawyers and taught 
as a craft rather than as a science. Exploring Weber’s typology further, more 
similarities of ethos and methodology emerge, situations in which the lawyer 
has displaced the law professor. For instance, Weber characterizes his first type 
as denoting a philosophy of legal training purely “empirical” and “practical,” 
and that led to “specialization.”4 According to Weber:
2. See Osama Siddique, Martial Laws and Lawyers: The Crisis of Legal Education in Pakistan 
and Key Areas of Reform, 5 Regent J. Int’l L. 95 (2007) [hereinafter Martial Laws and 
Lawyers]. The article conducts a historical review of various challenges and constraints 
faced by legal education in Pakistan. See also Richard Blue, Richard Hoffman, Management 
Systems International & Louis-Alexandre Berg, Pakistan Rule of Law Assessment—
Final Report 27–29 (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO130.pdf 
[hereinafter Pakistan Rule of Law Assessment].
3. See Max Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society 198 (Max Rheinstein, ed., 
Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein, trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1954) [hereinafter Max Weber]. 
4. See id. at 201.
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[T]his kind of legal training naturally produced a formalistic treatment of 
the law, bound by precedent and analogies drawn from precedent. Not only 
was systematic and comprehensive treatment of the whole body of the law 
prevented by the craft like specialization of the lawyers, but legal practice 
did not aim at all at a rational system but rather a practically useful scheme 
of contracts and actions, oriented towards the interests of clients in typically 
recurrent situations.5 
Prominent drawbacks of current law teaching in Pakistan include: the 
clear vocational orientation of most lawyers and judges who teach law; their 
emphasis on the practical at the cost of the theoretical and the abstract; the 
absence of research-based interdisciplinary, comparative or critical thinking; 
the virulent myopia toward the vital inter-linkages among politics, society, 
policy and the law; and the consequent embrace of given doctrine as gospel.6 
It is tempting to quote again from Weber who goes on to observe:
[W]herever legal education has been in the hands of practitioners, especially 
attorneys, who have made admission to practice a guild monopoly, an 
economic factor, namely, their pecuniary interest, brings to bear a strong 
influence upon the process not only of stabilizing the official law and of 
adapting it to changing needs in an exclusively empirical way but also of 
preventing its rationalization through legislation or legal science.7
The lawyers’ stranglehold on Pakistan’s legal education system promotes 
and sustains an invasion of law schools by a guild-like, mechanical approach to 
training in law. One is told how, in the past, leading lawyers of the country—
practitioners in the old mold who were generalists, read widely and thought 
deeply—considered it public service also to teach and were apparently inspiring 
and thought-provoking teachers. That is no longer the case, as the leading 
lawyers are far too busy and gainfully employed. With exceptions, those who 
teach now are those with spare time. In many ways, the stranglehold of lawyers 
is symptomatic of the same ethos embedded in approaches to justice-sector 
reform in Pakistan, in which the “legal community”8 has played a prominent 
part. As a result, the existing structure, framework and salient features of the 
legal-judicial system seldom are questioned in fundamental ways. 
In this context, it is poignant to quote from a typical perspective on the 
nation’s legal education by a senior Pakistani lawyer. His remarks epitomize 
the Pakistani legal fraternity’s attitudes toward the idea of a career legal 
academy:
5. Id.
6. See Martial Laws and Lawyers, supra note 2, at 98–107. 
7. See Weber, supra note 3, at 202–03.
8. I use this term to describe judges, lawyers, court staff, government policymakers and law 
officials, as well as local and international policy-reform consultants.
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It may however be stated that insistence on a full time faculty is not a rational 
demand of the university. Most of the subjects taught in the class rooms pertain 
to laws concerning the claims of the litigants. In this situation a practicing 
lawyer, with requisite experience at the bar, is a far better choice than a person 
who has no nexus with the day to day problems being faced by the litigants 
and issues arising in the court rooms during the trial of the case. Full time staff 
being underpaid, loses interest and therefore the best alternative is to have not 
more than [25] percent permanent staff in the faculty.9
At least the use of the word “faculty” in the above text is welcome for it is 
novel—“teacher,” as mentioned earlier, is the word most commonly employed 
for the legal academy. The words “academics,” “scholars,” and “researchers” 
mostly are absent from both the lexicon as well as the imagination or denote a 
career change necessitated by an indifferent time at the bar.
The Sociology of the Legal Profession
Let’s turn to a brief, necessary overview of the legal profession in Pakistan. 
Despite the paramount importance of lawyers in an adversarial system 
of adjudication, the Pakistani legal profession is acutely understudied. 
Meaningful regulation of the legal bars also historically has been neglected. 
Most Pakistani lawyers and judges now are locally trained and this results 
in not just frequent resentment toward and distrust of the gradually growing 
cadres of foreign-trained lawyers and even some judges but also paranoia about 
any talk of reforms of legal education and the profession. These proposals at 
times draw legitimate opposition as alien in origin and hence unsuitable in 
the local context; more often, however, they are rejected out of parochialism, 
as they seek to amend a system that the incumbents are comfortable with and 
thrive in—regardless of its various inequities, inefficiencies and other costs for 
its end-users.10 
Hundreds of bar councils and associations exist at the tehsil (administrative 
division), district, provincial and national levels. According to some estimates, 
there are 89,624 lawyers now enrolled to practice in different Pakistani 
courts. Of these, 43,964 are licensed to practice only in the district courts.11 
9. Syed Afzal Haider, Legal Education 10, unpublished paper, available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/Articles/6/2.pdf. It is no coincidence that this undated article is 
available on the website of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The ideological affinity and 
everyday nexus of a senior Supreme Court lawyer with his arena of daily activity has a direct 
bearing here with the exalted access accorded to his views on legal education.
10. For a description and discussion of the law degrees and programs in Pakistan, see Martial 
Laws and Lawyers, supra note 2. Those who train in the law abroad have traditionally headed 
almost exclusively to the island that once ruled this part of the world. Now the trend is 
changing in favor of U.S. law schools as well as law schools in many other commonwealth 
countries. 
11. Of these, 4,118 are Supreme Court advocates, 30,000 are in the High Court in Punjab, 
6,840 are in the High Court in Sindh, 3,171 are in the High Court in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 
and 1,531 are in the High Court in Baluchistan. There are 22,000; 9,214; 10,606; and 2,144 
advocates in the subordinate courts in the four provinces in the same order as above. See 
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The actual number of active, practicing lawyers is estimated to be lower, 
as many law graduates never practice or give it up soon after fulfilling the 
barely challenging requirements to earn a law degree. However, even if we 
take these numbers to denote active practicing lawyers, it would be instructive 
to determine per capita access to lawyers in diverse regions of the country. 
Using the most conservative population statistics, for every 10,000 Pakistanis 
there are six lawyers (who are enrolled to practice in all Pakistani courts) and 
three district court lawyers. Further, the following are the number of enrolled 
district lawyers for every 10,000 residents in the different provinces: Punjab 
(2.5 lawyers); Sindh (2.75 lawyers); Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (5 lawyers); and 
Baluchistan (2.5 lawyers). These low overall numbers do not reflect that within 
the provinces, actual access depends on proximity to towns and cities, and that 
many rural Pakistanis live in remote areas and, hence, face more challenges in 
access. In comparison, the following are the number of available lawyers per 
10,000 residents of different countries: United States (37 lawyers); Brazil (30.5 
lawyers); New Zealand (25.5 lawyers); Spain (25 lawyers); United Kingdom (25 
lawyers); Italy (20.5 lawyers); Germany (17 lawyers); and France (7 lawyers).12 
Historically, the legal bars in Pakistan have been highly politicized, as 
well as politically divided. Other than inadequate emphasis on professional 
regulation, this also is due to the active role played by South Asian lawyers 
in the years leading up to independence. Many of the most prominent 
leaders of the independence struggle such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
Mohandas K. Gandhi, Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Jarwaharlal Nehru, 
were lawyers. Further, Pakistani lawyers and lawyers-turned-politicians have 
been prominent in pro-democracy movements against military dictatorships, 
closely allied with political parties, and active in national politics. It is also 
key to note that aspirants, while maintaining close alliances with political 
Judicial System of Pakistan, supra note 1. A lesser overall figure of 81,209 lawyers is reported 
in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Information on the Administration of Justice, in Annual 
Report, April 2010—December 2011, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/Annual_
rpt_ap09mar10/13.pdf. The population figures for calculating these numbers come from 
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan Demographic Survey 2007, available at http://www.
pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/population_satistics/publications/pds2007/complete_
report.pdf [hereinafter Pakistan Demographic Survey 2007]. It should be noted that there is 
no legal professional distinction in Pakistan between solicitors and barristers, as in the U.K., 
or specialized legal bars, as in the U.S. Lawyers often are both solicitors and litigators, 
unless someone chooses to engage in purely advisory work or litigation. Further, Pakistani 
lawyers often practice in all areas of law except for those who develop a specialization and a 
market reputation in a particular field.
12. See Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice 27 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). It should be noted that these international figures seem to 
reflect the total number of enrolled lawyers, while the provincial figures provided by me for 
Pakistan are only for district court lawyers. However, since district court lawyers constitute 
the bulk of Pakistani lawyers and the difference between the Pakistani and the international 
figures is so vast, even the addition of Pakistani appellate court lawyers to the total numbers 
used for calculating these figures will not make much of a difference, as can be seen from 
the Pakistani national figures for all lawyers and district court lawyers. Pakistani population 
statistics have been taken from Pakistan Demographic Survey 2007, supra note 11. 
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parties, have pursued successful routes to prestigious appointments to the 
appellate courts that include: election to offices in legal bars; appointments 
to government positions in the Attorney General’s or the provincial Advocate 
Generals’ offices (which invariably are politically motivated). These rich career 
incentives as well as the active street-mobilization potential of lawyers, convert 
bar council elections into mini-battles between various political-ideological 
factions. Further, election to bar offices is coveted not only for the political 
leverage they provide but also for the public perception of clout, which, in 
turn, boosts clientele for those elected. 
With bar councils acting as political party strongholds or platforms for 
personal career advancement, professional entrance standards and the ethical 
regulation of the legal fraternity have been weak. International donor-driven 
interventions for bar reforms have been regarded with great mistrust and 
strongly resisted, due both to an acute paranoia stemming from Pakistan’s 
experience with periodic attempts by military governments to use “reform” 
as a mechanism to “tame” lawyers, as well as various vested interests within 
the lawyer community. Consequently, there are no credible bar examinations;13 
no continuing legal education and professional development programs;14 
and lackluster internal disciplinary mechanisms.15 The constantly increasing 
supply of largely ill-trained law graduates, at the same time, exerts tremendous 
pressure to keep the standards for entering the legal bars low. Paradoxically, 
while per capita availability of lawyers is low, the low entrance standards 
expose the profession to overpopulation by lawyers lacking rudimentary skills 
and competence. Their growing numbers reinforce the inertia and resistance 
to raising standards. In many countries, the primary motives to maintain bar 
13. For instance, recently introduced bar examinations in Punjab fall well short of testing the 
candidates’ proficiency in legal concepts and substantive procedural laws. They exclusively 
focus on testing rote knowledge of some mechanical rules. Further, the pass rate of these 
exams is almost 100 percent, an indictment of their rigor. The situation is similar in other 
provinces. These bar exams also are of recent provenance, introduced as late as 2005 in 
Punjab. Prior to that, unregulated clerkships for a period of time sufficed for obtaining the 
license to practice in the district courts. Induction into the High Court and Supreme Court 
bars historically has required an interview and more scrutiny of eligibility. But over the years, 
lawyers of widely variable quality have managed to gain membership, not least because of 
frequent changes in the ex officio judges and bar representatives entrusted with admissions 
scrutiny. Standards and motivations vary greatly among these individuals. 
14. Several endeavors in 2005–06 failed to start such programs in conjunction with the 
Canadian Bar Association due to lack of support by local legal bars. However, a major new 
European Union funded program focusing, inter alia, on certain aspects of bar reform and 
the provision of legal aid is expected to launch in the province of Punjab in early 2014.
15. The ineffectiveness of these internal disciplinary mechanisms is a source of constant public 
criticism. More recently, their laxness was exposed in incidents involving lawyers beating 
journalists, police and even district court judges. Despite intense media scrutiny and public 
outrage, the offenders were let off with light punishments by investigating bar disciplinary 
committees. See e.g., Amir Riaz, Lawyers again rough up journalists, The Nation, Aug. 07, 
2009, available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/
Politics/07-Aug-2009/Lawyers-again-rough-up-journalists. Such inglorious incidents are on 
the rise in the district courts. 
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entry standards include professional pride and a consequent commitment 
to high professional and ethical standards, as well as a desire to restrict the 
legal fee pie to a select few. But in Pakistan, the aforementioned political 
constituency-building imperatives largely have prevailed.16 They have eroded 
the space, culture and motivation for meaningful dialogue within the bars 
to assess their performance and the overall quality and direction of the legal 
profession.17 
Especially but not exclusively at the district courts, local lawyer-bar 
alliances also are structured along ethnic and occupational caste lines. For 
many rural litigants, these can be significant criteria for choosing a lawyer or 
their only common reference point for contacting and trusting one.18 In poor 
areas with low education, lawyers often are the only educated and connected 
people around, with the less privileged relying on them for favors and advice.19 
Further, the legal profession is still dominated by small family firms. Sons 
join or follow fathers into the profession and use the inherited office, library, 
staff and clients. Bigger cities have scores of somewhat larger firms and lately 
some boutique partnerships. These are set up by young foreign law graduates, 
are not structured along kinship, and often offer specialized expertise. These 
are primarily not profit-sharing firms with career routes for new entrants to 
equity sharing partnerships along the standard U.S. large law firm model but 
purely cost-sharing arrangements. They operate in the upper echelons of legal 
practice (mostly corporate and commercial or high end civil, criminal and 
constitutional work) and absorb a handful of the multitudes of law graduates 
16. During 2005–06, the author interviewed prominent officeholders of the Punjab Bar Council 
and the Lahore High Court Bar Association. They reported that a one-year term for the 
officeholders meant that successful candidates relied on votes from young law graduates 
seeking admission to the bar. Further, they regarded the short stint in office as grossly 
inadequate for developing a longer vision of and stake in meaningful reform. Many also 
considered declining entry to the profession to any young law graduates as manifestly unjust 
in a country where many found the pursuit of higher education elusive and expensive. 
Stringent entry barriers, they said, were tantamount to forcing unemployment on these 
candidates. There are more reasons for the rapid influx of new lawyers into the profession. 
For instance, due to the low bar to entry, civil servants also start practicing law after 
retirement. Further, a demonstrated aptitude for the law is not a necessary prerequisite for 
entry to the profession, as students who find the going tough in other fields often take up 
law as a less taxing alternative. They hope that with enough years spent making the rounds 
of the courts, experience will make up for inadequacies of law school training; this prospect 
never materializes for many. Their association with the profession is reduced to wearing the 
standard black uniform of Pakistani lawyers, sitting around the bar rooms, and participating 
in political agitation. 
17. Election canvassing during bar elections at various levels demonstrates the importance of 
political and even ethnic and caste associations in such elections to the candidates’ prospects 
of success.
18. See Osama Siddique, Law in Practice—The Lahore District Courts Litigants Survey (2010–
2011) 94–95 (Development Policy Research Centre, Working Paper June 2010), available at 
http://dprc.lums.edu.pk/components/com_publications/attachments/Law-In-Practice-
Lahore-District-Courts-Litigants-Survey.pdf. 
19. Id. 
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entering the market every year. As for the vast majority of new law graduates, 
they essentially join senior lawyers as low-paid apprentices or strike out on 
their own and often remain brief-less for years. The development of law firms 
and creation of in-house positions in the public and private sectors have not 
kept pace. Young lawyers report lessening exposure to training by senior 
lawyers as the professional market grows ever more saturated.20 
Institutional Friction and Abandoned Reform
After surveying the state of the Pakistani legal education system, the 
sociology of its legal bars and the hegemonic control over their operations by 
lawyers, let’s briefly examine some recent attempts to reform legal education 
in Pakistan. The most significant opportunity for this was created at the 
beginning of the last decade as part of a $350-million (U.S.) soft loan from the 
Asian Development Bank for justice-sector reform in Pakistan under its “Access 
to Justice Program.” The program acknowledged that the quality of legal 
education has a direct impact on the capacity to absorb new ideas; the worth 
of judges, legal practitioners, legal research and policy-making; citizens’ legal 
awareness and empowerment; and the depth and sustainability of academic, 
policy and democratic discourses. The program accordingly put forward three 
policy goals for legal education including, the establishment of centers of 
excellence in legal education; establishment of a window in the “Access to 
Justice Development Fund” to support innovations in legal education;21 and, 
finally, actual establishment of the proposed centers of excellence.22 
To its credit, instead of beating about the bush, the program categorically 
embraced the historic neglect of legal education in Pakistan and failure of past 
reforms owing to multiple factors. These factors included, unclear regulatory 
arrangements and overlapping regulatory jurisdictions and absence of genuine 
institutional stakeholders; low bars of entry to law schools and the paucity of 
new and dynamic law schools; outdated legal curricula; inadequate teaching 
pedagogy; a dearth of full-time, research-focused academics with consequent 
reliance by law colleges on part-time faculties; lack of financial and other career 
incentives for the legal academy; inadequate infrastructure and facilities; 
20. This description is based on the author’s experience conducting research on legal education 
and bar reforms in Pakistan since 2005, which has involved regular interaction with various 
legal bars and law colleges/faculties.
21. The access program required the establishment of an “Access to Justice Development 
Fund” to provide additional funds to the judiciary, as part of its broader policy imperative 
of increasing overall funding for the Pakistani judiciary and introducing modern budgeting 
methodology.
22. The first policy action was linked to the release of the first segment of the access program loan. 
Actual implementation was deferred to the third and last segments, though legal education 
reform should have been taken up as a priority from the very start. This is both because it 
is difficult and time-consuming and because of its fundamental importance to overall and 
sustainable improvement in the justice sector. See Syed Ali Murtaza & Osama Siddique, The 
Retrospective Report: Mapping and Assessment of Justice Sector Interventions, Donors 
and Government, 1998–2010 (The Asia Foundation 2010) (on file with the author). 
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unsatisfactory law school governance; a near absence of a research culture and 
legal textbooks and treatises; and less-than-appreciative social and cultural 
attitudes toward a career in the academy.23 The program also acknowledged that 
the legal bars had more or less usurped a central role in the governance of legal 
education when they ought to have concentrated instead on continuing legal 
education, and regular and stringent bar examinations and exam curricula. 
Furthermore, the program was fully mindful that the education commission 
had neither displayed the will nor the capacity to perform its necessary role in 
legal education regulation and reform.24 
Leaders in the access program vetted potential supervising institutions 
for the centers of excellence. These included, the Federal Judicial Academy, 
the main training academy for the country’s judges that several provincial 
academies since have followed and all of which remain largely dysfunctional;25 
the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, a federal government institution 
operating under supervision of the Supreme Court with multiple research, 
advisory and recommendatory functions pertaining to law reform; and the 
higher education commission. Though all were found to lack the requisite 
capacity and experience, the commission eventually was selected as it showed 
the most interest in the initiative and because of its official mandate as the 
regulatory authority for all higher education institutions. The commission also 
agreed to invest some of its own funds in this initiative. The Lahore University 
of Management Sciences (LUMS)—a private, nonprofit university established 
in 1985—also agreed to lend assistance as a possible role model since it had 
recently introduced a new and much improved legal curriculum for a five-
year B.A.-LL.B. degree. Further, the university had demonstrated an initial 
commitment to develop a full-time research faculty, improve pedagogical 
and examination approaches, and create an institutional structure for legal 
education in line with international best practices. 
However, there could not be a greater contrast between the official 
reporting of successful compliance with the reform goals and the actual failure 
of reform, as reflected in the access program’s hastily aborted forays into the 
reform of legal education in Pakistan.26 To date, none of the proposed centers 
of excellence has been established and there seems no likelihood any will 
23. See Martial Laws and Lawyers, supra note 2, at 100–15.
24. See id. at 109–15. 
25. See Osama Siddique, Report on Training Needs for Judges and Court Staff (USAID 2010) 
(on file with the author). This report details the sorry state of the one federal and four 
provincial judicial training academies, based on interviews with district judges and the 
administrative and academic managers and staff of the judicial academies; a close review 
of their annual calendars and past course offerings as well as their respective curricula and 
syllabi; and a qualitative assessment of their respective faculties, teaching and examination 
methods and other related aspects. See also Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with 
Formal Law: An Alien Justice 398–409 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
26. For a detailed critical discussion of different historical reform approaches in Pakistan and 
their outcomes, see Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien 
Justice (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). 
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be in the foreseeable future.27 The fund for “innovations in legal education” 
also remains untapped.28 The failure to create the centers offers a classic 
demonstration of superficial donor commitment to what actually are difficult 
“soft” reforms. The program simply backed off when faced with entrenched 
institutional and personal rivalries, lack of public concern and the absence of 
a push for educational reform. In brief, the education commission developed 
serious differences with the Ministry of Law on administrative and operational 
matters—quite apart from ego battles between key personnel. A change of 
leadership in the access program’s management unit caused it to fall short 
in helping resolve conflicts between the education commission and the law 
ministry. Meanwhile, the bar council stayed aloof from this initiative—and even 
turned hostile toward the access program because of its earlier, limited and 
fruitless effort to woo the legal fraternity to its vision of bar reforms. The bar 
leadership felt that the access program largely ignored them. The education 
commission also did not develop its institutional capacity to push the centers 
of excellence initiative. Although contracts to hire external legal education 
specialists were drafted, no one was ever hired as the stalemate festered 
between the education commission and the law ministry. After its brief flash of 
initial exuberance, the access program’s staff fairly soon decided to move on. 
It subsequently made some attempts to revive the project but the momentum 
was lost and the sorry state of legal education in the country persists.
Subsequently, in 2006, the education commission decided to venture on 
its own and set up a national law university. It initially was to have three 
campuses, in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore, and eventually two more 
campuses, in Peshawar and Quetta.29 Some premises were rented for the 
campuses, initial staff were hired, policies were developed, some books and 
furniture were procured and faculty candidates were interviewed. But the 
27. The access program initially earmarked $5 million (U.S.) to create the centers of excellence 
in legal education. They were to (a) identify the most promising public and private law 
colleges for further capacity building and technical investment; (b) create an evaluation 
system for assessing the initial needs of these institutions and address them through 
strategic, regular investments in faculty building, curricular development, pedagogical and 
evaluative systems improvement, enhanced research capacity, and improved library and 
electronic research facilities; and (c) conduct regular qualitative evaluation of these selected 
institutions and review their performance through an independent accreditation system 
housed in a suitable Pakistani institution and assisted by international and regional legal 
education experts. Non-performing institutions then were supposed to be closed after a 
three-year period of sustained investment and evaluation, while good performers were to be 
assisted to retain their gains and upgraded accreditation.
28. Between 2004 and 2008, the author was directly involved with the design of the centers of 
excellence project and its implementation plan as a consultant to the Asian Development 
Bank. He subsequently also advised the education commission when the idea of setting up 
the centers was in play. He met multiple times and negotiated with the judicial leadership, 
the education commission, the Pakistan Bar Council, legal academics, leading lawyers, and 
various relevant departments, including the Federal Judicial Academy, the law ministry, and 
the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan. 
29. See Ahmad Ali Khan, Strengthening Legal Education: Role of Higher Education 
Commission and Bar Councils (2012) (on file with the author). 
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national law school project also foundered due to fractious relations among 
institutional stakeholders in Pakistan in general and entrenched opposition by 
bar council members in particular.30
The latest effort to somehow conjure a center of excellence is to upgrade 
the highly incapacitated federal judicial academy to the status of a National 
University of Law and Judicial Administration. The education commission has 
approved its draft charter and a “No Objection Certificate” has been issued.
The charter has been sent to the law ministry for its scrutiny. Quite predictably, 
while no one has said anything about the intellectual and academic dimensions 
of the project, work on its infrastructure apparently is in full-swing. It appears 
that at least enhanced infrastructure (though the academy already possesses 
ample, unused built space) will exist by the middle of 2014.
Conclusions
In the discourse over Pakistan’s decade and a half long efforts at legal 
education reform, certain key characteristics and developments stand out. 
First, the process has been dominated by lawyers through the bar council 
and now increasingly by the judges through the law and justice commission. 
Neither the lawyers nor the judges, however, possess sufficient expertise or 
time to comprehensively visualize what quality legal education entails. At 
times, parochial politics, changing leadership, interests vested in maintaining 
the status-quo vis-à-vis existing public and private law colleges, and a 
propensity to allow institutional and personal clashes to grow and fester also 
have not helped the cause. Second, while the education commission fixated 
initially on promoting the cause of natural sciences and showed little interest 
in the social sciences, when it eventually decided to push reform in the latter, 
particularly in legal education, it neither had the capacity nor the leverage to 
lead. Further, after the Eighteenth Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution 
in 2010, the commission now has been more or less defanged as regulatory 
power in higher education has devolved to the provinces, which, in turn, 
has ushered in a period of acute uncertainty as to future directions of higher 
education in Pakistan. Third, projects for wholesale reform in legal education 
seem to be imagined either as big bang creations of centers of excellence and 
national law universities, rising magically out of the existing morass, or in 
accelerated metamorphosis of crumbling, existing institutional edifices like 
the federal judicial academy.
Though there is token attention to the “human resource” dimension, 
ultimately there is little deeper appreciation that it is the quality of the 
people and an academic ethos and supporting culture that builds and 
define institutions of legal education. Because the bar council, the education 
commission, the law and justice commission and the judicial academy all lack 
real, resident and dedicated expertise in legal education, the reforms they have 
30. The author volunteered time in the early stages of this project to help develop an institutional 
structure, curriculum, and governing policies and was a member of the interview panel that 
interviewed and hired various faculty candidates. 
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backed are unrealistic. How to identify, attract, nurture, incentivize and retain 
high quality faculty invariably is least important in their imaginings; instead 
they focus on procuring furniture, renting premises, acquiring real estate 
and building infrastructure. This malaise also has migrated to the private 
sector. Promising institutions like LUMS31 display an upstart’s fascination 
for new buildings and facilities rather than substantive educational reform. 
Solid advocates for quality legal education who are dedicated academics 
were and remain few and far between; they largely are overlooked and remain 
un-consulted in the discourse on national reform in legal education. Mere 
silhouettes against the luminous backdrop of any new and grandiose blueprint 
for action, they are expected to migrate like indentured laborers to whichever 
new initiatives catch the fancy of the so-called reformers. 
In this context, it is worth noting that there are many similarities between 
the early and continuing problems, constraints, foibles and attitudes that 
have inhibited improvements to legal education in India and Pakistan. But 
India, after some false starts, arguably made a crucial departure by creating the 
national law schools.32 That experience brought about many telling changes 
in perspective and emphasis in the discourse on Indian legal education. It 
triggered a virtuous circle of sorts that continues. There is a related and rich 
debate on what the national law school experiment has achieved and where 
it has faltered. It has generated a culture of sustained, high quality local 
research. It successfully persuaded some of India’s best graduates to forego 
lucrative corporate careers to pursue instead lives in public-minded litigation 
for worthy causes and in the Indian legal academy. That academy largely 
continues to offer the unattractive combination of bureaucratic inertia and 
low salaries.33 But the national law school endeavor decisively changed Indian 
legal education, its methods and thinking, in notable and praiseworthy ways.34 
From my perspective, a distinct feature that has accorded continuing success 
and longevity to this experiment is that, in substantial part, the change emerged 
organically and incrementally from the visions, ideas, travails and tribulations 
of those who have lived and breathed legal education in India. I clearly speak 
here of the Indian academics and not of sundry lawyers and judges who like 
to pontificate about legal education over their afternoon cups of tea after the 
31. The university has pioneered a law and policy department (recently elevated to the status 
of an autonomous school), focused on developing an exciting, five-year, inter-disciplinary 
B.A-LL.B. curriculum and has put in place a research-driven career faculty.
32. For a concise history of this significant move, see Lovely Dasgupta, Reforming Indian Legal 
Education: Linking Research and Teaching, 59 J. Legal Educ. 432 (2010).
33. These failings were openly conceded in detailed conversations with  Professor A. Jayagovind, 
the then-Vice Chancellor of National Law School of India, Bangalore, in Bangalore in 2005, 
with Professor Ranbir Singh, the then-Vice Chancellor of NALSAR University, Hyderbad, 
in Shanghai in 2005, and with Professor V. S. Rekhi, former Director, National Law Institute 
University at Bhopal, in Delhi, in 2007.
34. See N. R. Madhava Menon, The Transformation of Indian Legal Education: A Blue Paper 
(Harvard Law School Program on the Legal Profession 2012), available at http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdf/Menon_Blue_Paper.pdf.
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“more important business of the day” is out of the way. This reform occurred 
because of academic visionaries embedded, operating and striving within the 
Indian legal education system and thinking deeply about it. These include 
pioneers like Upendra Baxi and academic leaders like N.R. Madhav Menon 
with track records of illustrious confrontations with institutional inertia. They 
have energized other like-minded peers as well as a promising crop of younger 
scholars, leaving an indelible imprint on the choice of the path taken by Indian 
legal education to recovery.35 It is crucial that they stepped up when they did 
to steer Indian legal education out of the wilderness that it had once shared 
with its neighbor. India has not advanced to where it needs to be. Still, with 
necessary and meaningful modifications, the Indian reform model is much 
more relevant for Pakistan than any alien transplant or than the top-down, 
whimsical prescriptions of local judges and lawyers. It is definitely the former 
that Pakistan’s already thin and fast disappearing population of legal scholars 
must scrutinize. 
35. It has been argued persuasively that although the early Indian experience with foreign 
ideas of reform contributed to Indian thinking, it was essentially Indian perspectives 
and experiences that molded what eventually turned out to be organic, meaningful and 
sustainable reform. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American 
Academics, The Ford Foundation, and The Development of Legal Education in India, 
46 Am. J. Legal His. 447 (2004). It is also worth pointing out how the deep and incisive 
writings on the Indian legal system from established international scholars like Marc 
Galanter and esteemed local commentators like Rajeev Dhavan contributed to the culture 
of local scholarly debate. In the spring of 2012, I had the great pleasure and privilege of 
meeting both gentlemen together in Delhi for some highly engaging hours. The discussion 
was as intellectually electrifying as I am sure it has been for the past many decades. 
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